The Liberal Value of Privacy by Boudewijn de Bruin
BOUDEWIJN DE BRUIN
THE LIBERAL VALUE OF PRIVACY
(Accepted 17 March 2010)
ABSTRACT. This paper presents an argument for the value of privacy that is
basedonapurelynegative concept of freedomonly. I showthatprivacy invasions
may decrease a person’s negative freedom as well as a person’s knowledge about
the negative freedom she possesses. I argue that not only invasions that lead to
actual interference, but also invasions that lead to potential interference (many
casesof identity theft) constitute actual harmto the invadee’s liberty interests, and
I critically examine the courts’ reliance on a principle of ‘no harm, no foul’ in
recent data breach cases. Using a number of insights from the psychology of
human belief, I also show that the liberal claim for protection of privacy is
strengthened by the observation that often the privacy invader cannot be held
responsible for the inﬂuence on the invadee’s negative freedom.
I. INTRODUCTION
Liberal thinkers wrestle with privacy, especially if they operate
with a negative concept of freedom.1 Some even hold that
1 An invasion of the privacy of a person, B, involves an agent, A, disclosing
a fact about B to a third person, C. A and B may be identical. It is a triadic
relation between a sender, a subject, and a recipient. This sets the notion apart
from the way the term is used in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965)
and Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973), where privacy is rather deﬁned in terms
of abilities to decide and act. If we use such a ‘decisional’ concept of privacy
instead of the ‘informational’ concept that underlies the present paper, a
connection between privacy and freedom can be demonstrated directly. See,
for instance, Judith DeCew, ‘The Priority of Privacy’, Social Philosophy and
Policy 17 (2000): 213–234; R. G. Frey, ‘Privacy, Control, and Talk of Rights’,
Social Philosophy and Policy 17 (2000): 45–67; Robert Hallsborg, Jr., ‘Prin-
ciples of Liberty and the Right to Privacy’, Law and Philosophy 5 (1986): 175–
218; AdamMoore, ‘Privacy: Its Meaning and Value’, American Philosophical
Quarterly 40 (2003): 215–227. The connection between informational privacy
and negative freedom uncovered in this paper is rather more indirect.
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privacy has little liberal value and ought not to receive much
special legal protection. These thinkers see the pursuit of pri-
vacy as self-interested economic behavior, aimed at concealing
‘discreditable’ facts about oneself, which is opposed to liberal
interests such as freedom of speech, freedom of market trans-
actions, or security.2 Generally, therefore, such thinkers do not
object to the presence of surveillance cameras in public spaces,
to bookstores forwarding information about purchases to
companies and government agencies, or to airlines requiring
numerous items of data from travelers boarding planes. Nat-
urally, these skeptics about the value of privacy acknowledge
that the disclosure of private information can have unpleasant,
even harmful eﬀects, but they assert that such eﬀects are out-
weighed by liberty (free speech, security, economic growth,
etc.), and that most problems arising from invasions of privacy
should be left to individuals rather than the state to redress.3
2 Richard Posner, The Economics of Law (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1981), p. 233ﬀ.
3 Skeptical positions about privacy have been articulated by many au-
thors – not all of them liberals. For example, Anita Allen,Why Privacy Isn’t
Everything: Feminist Reﬂections on Personal Accountability (Lanham:
Rowman and Littleﬁeld, 2003); Richard Epstein, ‘Deconstructing Privacy:
And Putting It Back Together Again’, Social Philosophy and Policy 17
(2000): 1–24; Amitai Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy (New York: Basic
Books, 1999); Catharine MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the
State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989); Posner, The Economics
of Law; Jesper Ryberg, ‘Privacy Rights, Crime Prevention, CCTV, and the
Life of Mrs Aremac’, Res Publica 13 (2007): 127–143; Michael Sandel,
Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). I am concerned most with such
authors as Allen, Epstein, and Posner, who combine skepticism about pri-
vacy with a form of liberalism and individualism. Their position diﬀers from
feminist and communitarian critiques of privacy, as well as from the noth-
ing-to-hide argument popularly defended by many laypeople. The nothing-
to-hide argument against privacy is to the eﬀect that as long as I do not
perform any illegal and immoral acts, I have nothing to be afraid of, and
consequently, I do not have to hide anything. In contrast to proponents of
the nothing-to-hide argument, liberal privacy skeptics acknowledge that
even though I do not perform illegal or immoral actions, others may use
information about me in ways that harm me. See Daniel Solove, ‘ ‘‘I’ve Got
Nothing to Hide’’ and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy’, San Diego Law
Review 44 (2007): 745–772.
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Traditional arguments for privacy fail to convince the liberal
skeptic. Take the argument from perspective change. This is to
the eﬀect that, if I were to discover someone observing me while
I am engaged in certain activities, I would change from being a
genuine ‘participant’ in the action to being an ‘observer’ of it,
which – the argument states – is bad.4 However, many privacy
skeptics will probably not be troubled overmuch by subjective
feelings of perspective changes. They will hold that, after all, it
is possible to carry out the tasks irrespective of whether or not
someone is watching you.
Take now the argument from relationships. According to this
argument, privacy is a necessary condition for many human
relationships, because relationships involve the mutual giving
of gifts in the form of information exchange; and such gift
giving only prospers when individuals have secure possession of
what they want to give, namely, private information.5 Yet does
another person’s listening into a conversation between friends
really make it impossible to share intimate thoughts and feel-
ings? The privacy skeptic will doubt that. The friends may feel
inhibited, but that does not mean that they are inhibited.
Or take the argument from human dignity, according to
which invasions of a person’s privacy go against her dignity.
This is exempliﬁed by a famous case that came before the
Michigan Supreme Court in 1881 in which a woman laid a
complaint against a man who had been present when she was
giving birth, and who was presumed to be connected to the
medical profession whereas in fact he was not.6 Thereby, it was
4 See Stanley Benn, A Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1988), pp. 271–278; Robert Gerstein, ‘Intimacy and Privacy’,
Ethics 89 (1978): 76–81.
5 Developed mainly by Charles Fried, ‘Privacy’, Yale Law Journal 77
(1968): 475–493, and James Rachels, ‘Why is Privacy Important?’ Philoso-
phy & Public Aﬀairs 4 (1975): 323–333, the argument is revisited by Jean
Cohen, Regulating Intimacy: A New Legal Paradigm (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2002), and Julie Inness, Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
6 DeMay v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160 (1881).
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claimed, he aﬀronted the woman’s dignity.7 Now, in this case
privacy skeptics will not be so callous as to ignore the fact that
the woman suﬀered feelings of ‘shame and mortiﬁcation’, but
what they will condemn is the man’s pretending to a false
identity, rather than an invasion of privacy.8
Finally, take the argument from autonomy. Starting from the
assumption that the possession of correct beliefs about what
others know about me fosters my autonomy, this argument
claims that it is in my interest to be in control of what others
know about me.9 It matters, for instance, in terms of my
decision to practice the salsa in my oﬃce whether or not I know
someone is watching me. But again, liberal privacy skeptics
would not be moved. Someone peeping through my oﬃce
window in no way obstructs me from dancing.
To convince the skeptic of the liberal value of privacy, we
would have to show that invasions of a person’s privacy
7 Classic statements of this argument are those of Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’, Harvard Law Review 4 (1890):
193–220, and Edward Bloustein, ‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity:
An Answer to Dean Prosser’, New York University Law Review 39 (1964):
962–1007. More recent articulations are given by Hallsborg Jr., ‘Principles
of Liberty and the Right to Privacy’, and Iris Marion Young, ‘A Room of
One’s Own: Old Age, Extended Care, and Privacy’, in Privacies: Philo-
sophical Evaluations, ed. Beate Ro¨ssler (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2004), pp. 168–186.
8 The defender of the argument from dignity could retort that we can
imagine that the woman refuses consent on the grounds that the presence of
the young man aﬀronts her dignity, and that this shows that the aﬀront to
dignity is independent of the consent. But then one has to answer the
question of what a person A, committed to protecting human dignity, ought
to do if she sees that B consents to C aﬀronting B’s dignity. If A stops C, she
will aﬀront B’s dignity by not respecting B’s autonomous choice. If A does
not stop C, she will be resigned to B’s dignity being aﬀronted.
9 Autonomy is the broad notion that goes far beyond bare negative
freedom. See, for instance, Mark Alﬁno and G. Randolph Maynes,
‘Reconstructing the Right to Privacy’, Social Theory and Practice 29 (2003):
1–18; Joseph Kupfer, ‘Privacy, Autonomy, and Self-Concept’, American
Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987): 81–89; Beate Ro¨ssler, The Value of Pri-
vacy, trans. R. D. V. Glasgow (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005); Alan Rubel,
‘Privacy and the USA Patriot Act: Rights, the Value of Rights, and
Autonomy’, Law and Philosophy 26 (2007): 119–159; Ferdinand Schoeman,
Privacy and Social Freedom (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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decrease the extent of her freedom. Is this possible? A ﬁrst
attempt to meet the challenge would be the following: Strictly
speaking, activities such as having sexual intercourse,
exchanging secret information, or giving birth can, as the
skeptic correctly notes, also be performed if someone were to
keep you under observation. But the ‘logic’ of these activities
requires that they be performed ‘unwatched’. If someone listens
in, it is just not possible, for example, to exchange secrets, or to
correct a friend’s mispronunciation of a particular foreign term
in a discreet and friendly manner. Similarly, it is impossible to
have sex or to give birth in the typical way if someone is
watching you.10
This attempt can only be successful, however, if we assume a
rather broad manner of describing actions, which is not uni-
versally accepted. Moreover, circularity is lurking, since ab-
sence of a privacy invasion now becomes part of the description
of the action. That is why I propose a different way to meet the
skeptical challenge.
First, we have to do some analysis. I show that disclosures of
private information about a person, A, may lead to a change in
the extent of A’s negative freedom as well as to a change in A’s
knowledge concerning the extent of her negative freedom. An
example of a change in negative freedom is the following. A
parent spies on the headmaster of her child’s school, discovers
he is gay, and reveals this publicly to other parents. A little
later, the headmaster is barred from entering the school and is
eventually forced to resign because of pressure exerted by
worried parents – a decrease in his negative freedom. An
example of a change in one’s knowledge about freedom is the
following: My bank’s computer server has been stolen. I do not
know whether the burglar wanted to get the computer hard-
ware or the ﬁnancial records stored on it, and hence my
knowledge about future interference is reduced. I am less sure
than I was prior to the burglary about, say, the chance that
criminals will try to obtain credit in my name, constituting a
decrease of knowledge about negative freedom that may ﬁnd
10 This line of argument was suggested by Rachels, ‘Why is Privacy
Important?’My discussion has beneﬁted from as discussion with Luc Bovens.
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reﬂection in the fact that I decide to buy insurance against
identity theft.
These are two cases in which a disclosure of private infor-
mation ultimately leads to reduced negative freedom, or re-
duced knowledge about negative freedom. Liberal privacy
skeptics may accept this analysis of privacy and negative free-
dom, but they may still hesitate to draw any further normative
conclusions, though, on the grounds that, as long as we have
antidiscrimination laws and laws against identity theft, no
further regulation is necessary. Empirical and conceptual rea-
sons show, however, that such hesitation is entirely misplaced.
Assigning moral and legal responsibility to the ‘recipients’ of
private information – in the above two cases, the parents, the
burglar – becomes problematic if, for instance, individuals act
on their prejudices. (Suppose some of the parents held the
outrageous, yet still extant prejudice that homosexuals are
more than likely pedophiles.)11 Moreover, the liberal interest
individuals have in knowledge concerning the extent of their
negative freedom is not aﬀected by laws. Laws against identity
theft may be adequate and well-enforced, but that does not
make me any less ignorant about what the burglar will do with
my private data once he has obtained the computer.
Section II, ‘‘Privacy, Freedom, and Knowledge’’ contains
the analysis, which also shows where the innovation of my
approach to privacy lies in comparison with alternatives.
Sections III and IV, ‘‘Privacy and Negative Freedom’’ and
‘‘Privacy and Knowledge About Negative Freedom’’, respec-
tively, discuss normative consequences. More speciﬁcally, the
former section looks into the normative relevance of empirical
and conceptual research bearing on responsibility, and the
latter section discusses the liberal value of knowledge about
negative freedom.
11 Albert Klassen, Colin Williams, and Eugene Levitt, Sex and Morality
in the U.S.: An Empirical Enquiry Under the Auspices of the Kinsey Institute
(Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1989).
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II. PRIVACY, FREEDOM, AND KNOWLEDGE
A. Privacy and negative freedom
I defend the claim here that disclosures of private information
lead to changes in one’s negative freedom, as well as to changes in
the knowledge one has concerning the extent of one’s negative
freedom. Negative freedom appears in many guises, though, so I
will ﬁrst deﬁne the notion I am applying. It is the ‘pure negative’
concept of freedom according to which I am unfree to perform
some action, A, if someone interferes with my performance of A
or if someone has the disposition to interfere with my perfor-
mance ofA if I were to attempt to performA.12 It does notmatter
here whether the interference is intentional or not. My negative
freedom to travel home is obstructed by the police blocking the
road (they interfere), by a highway robber forcing me to stop at
gunpoint (he has the disposition to interfere as soon as I attempt
to drive on), or by a bridge superintendent forgetting to close the
open bridge (unintentionally). But my negative freedom is not
restricted by my ignorance of topography, or my lack of driving
skills, or my absentmindedness (no external obstacles).
I begin, then, with a number of examples of how disclosures
of private information lead to less negative freedom. A top-
ranked midshipman at the Naval Academy, Joseph Steffan,
told his chaplain about his own homosexuality. The chaplain
passed on this information to his superiors, who forced Steffan
to resign (on the basis of old Pentagon regulations barring gay
people from the military, still operative in the late 1980s).13
A banker was illegally given access to a Maryland govern-
ment database of medical records. Obtaining knowledge about
the medical situations of a number of his bank’s customers, he
forced customers diagnosed with cancer to pay off their loans.14
Subsequent to the rape and murder of a seven-year-old girl,
Megan Kanka, numerous states implemented laws requiring
12 Matthew Kramer, The Quality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001). See also Ian Carter, A Measure of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999).
13 Steﬀan v. Perry, 41 F. 3d. 677 (1994).
14 Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy, p. 140.
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sex offenders to register with a public database allowing every
interested individual access to information about the sex
offenders’ home addresses, offenses, photographs, and many
other personal data. This has led, in some cases, to harassment
of sex offenders (and bystanders mistaken for them), to actual
vigilantism, and even to the death of registered sex offenders.15
Employers increasingly consult social networking websites
such as Facebook and MySpace in order to check the proﬁles of
candidates they consider hiring, and some even admit to having
decided against candidates because of the risque´ pictures such
proﬁles contain or the ‘wild’ student life boasted of. One college
student interviewed by a New York Times journalist reported
that as soon as he had removed some material from the Internet
he began to receive invitations to job interviews.16
As these cases exemplify, the connection between privacy
and negative freedom has a three-step structure. The ﬁrst step is
the very disclosure of information. A sender, A, discloses
information about a subject, B, to a recipient, C. (Note that A
and B may be identical.) Disclosure is used in a general sense
here, as it may involve not only speaking and writing but also
drawing C’s attention to a certain scene involving B that is
happening right now, sending C a photograph capturing B in a
certain situation, showing video footage of B, passing on B’s
criminal or medical records, or A allowing C to hack A’s
website containing B’s home address and social security num-
ber. The second step covers belief revision. On the basis of the
information obtained from A, agent C revises her earlier beliefs
about B. This may amount to adding more information, more
detail, and leaving earlier beliefs intact; often, though, it will
15 Michael Laforgia, ‘Sex Oﬀender Killed Outside Game Arcade’, Miami
Herald 18 December 2008; Jordi Nordheimer, ‘‘‘Vigilante’’ Attack in New
Jersey is Linked to Sex-Oﬀenders Law’, The New York Times 11 January
1995.
16 Alan Finder, ‘For Some, Online Persona Undermines Resume´’, The
New York Times 11 June 2006.
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involve a real change of belief.17 Finally, the third step involves
action. The new beliefs may motivate C to perform a certain
action she would not have performed if A had not given her the
information concerning B; and if performing this action con-
stitutes interference with B, then B’s negative freedom has been
reduced as a result of an invasion of privacy.18
The new beliefs can be reasons for C to perform some action,
but also merely to adopt a disposition to perform some action.
Consider the following two cases. Having learned that a con-
victed sex oﬀender moved into her neighborhood, a woman in
Timberlane, Washington, decided that she would gun him
down if he came too close to her house. The sex oﬀender never
did come close to her house, but if the woman’s decision was
genuine enough (there seems no reason to assume it was not),
the man would not have survived if he had tried.19 Many sex
oﬀenders are equally unfree to enter areas around kindergar-
tens and other schools. Most of them do not try, but if they did,
watchful and informed parents would stand in their way.
Likewise, several airline companies use information about
travel itineraries to decide on whom they choose to put on their
‘no-ﬂy lists’. Many of the individuals appearing on such lists
17 If an agent ‘updates’ her beliefs, she adopts the doxastic attitude of
belief towards a proposition, P, towards which she did not previously have a
doxastic attitude. If she ‘changes’ her beliefs, she adopts the doxastic atti-
tude of belief towards a proposition, P, towards which she previously held
the attitude of disbelief; that is, she changes from believing that P is true to
believing that P is false, or vice versa. In certain cases, agent C will decide to
retain her original beliefs, rejecting the new information. This is rational, for
instance, when A informs her about a proposition which has both low prior
probability and low conditional probability, given C’s current beliefs about
B, such as when A tells C that B was hijacked by extraterrestrials.
18 Just as much as new information may lead to the performance of a
certain action, it may also lead to the omission of a certain action. Per-
forming an action and omitting one can both be forms of interference. I can
interfere by actively blocking the road, or just by refraining from letting the
bridge down. For stylistic reasons I do not always refer to omissions
explicitly in what follows below. Nevertheless, what I say about actions is
also true of omissions.
19 Linda Keene, ‘Warning Signs: A New State Law Alerts Parents to
Predators in the Neighborhood and the Struggle to Cope Begins’, Seattle
Times 15 September 1991.
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never buy tickets from these airline companies, but if they did
they would be barred from ﬂying to certain destinations.20
The woman in Timberlane, Washington, did not use the new
information concerning the sex offender to perform an actual
interfering action, but she did use it to change her disposition to
act. The no-ﬂy policy similarly embodies a changed disposition
towards certain potential customers. Following the pure nega-
tive concept of freedom, these changed dispositions are a de-
crease of freedom, just as much as actual interference would
constitute a decrease of freedom. This means that the third step
in the connection between privacy and negative freedommay not
only involve the performance of an action (or omission), but also
the adoption of a disposition to perform (or omit) some action.
It might be objected that referring to ‘dispositions’ leads to
the inclusion of counterfactual or hypothetical obstacles, and
that that makes the deﬁnition of freedom too broad. Since this
ingredient is obviously essential to my analysis, let me say
something in defense of it.21 The counterfactuality resides not
in the interferer’s actions or dispositions (the woman’s decision
to kill the sex oﬀender and the no-ﬂy policy are very real) but in
the interferee’s performance of the action (the sex oﬀender
never actually entered her neighborhood, the person on the no-
ﬂy list never actually bought a one-way ticket from Tehran to
London). Suppose, for instance, that I am working in my oﬃce.
In one scenario, the door has been locked and I do not have a
key. I am unfree to leave. In another scenario, someone is
waiting outside my oﬃce. He has the key in his hands and if he
heard me walking to the door, he would lock it. I do not have
the key myself, so in this scenario, too, I cannot leave my oﬃce:
if I attempted to leave the room I would ﬁnd the door locked.
The pure negative view of freedom describes me as unfree in
both situations.
20 See, for instance, Sally Donnelly, ‘You Say Yusuf, I Say Youssouf…’,
Time.com. http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,702062,00.html.
Accessed 25 September 2004.
21 See for more details Matthew Kramer, ‘On the Counterfactual
Dimension of Negative Freedom’, Politics, Philosophy & Economics 2
(2003): 63–92.
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And, indeed, many unfreedoms are exactly of this form. That
I am unfree to protest against the government or to travel abroad
may involve actual barriers. More often, though, my unfreedom
will reside in the fact that if I attempted to protest or travel, I
would be interfered with. Excluding dispositions to interfere
would give rise to an implausible evaluation of the freedom of,
say, citizens of totalitarian regimes. Therefore, it is preferable to
have a concept of freedom that takes dispositions to interfere as
reductions of the extent of a person’s negative freedom.
Disclosure of privacy leads to belief revision, which in turn
leads to the performance of actions, or dispositions to perform
actions. This framework is entirely general. To be sure, privacy
cases dealt with by legal scholars and philosophers witness
decreases of negative freedom most of the time, but there is no
reason why disclosure of information would lead to decreases
of one’s negative freedom in all cases. If agent A discloses
information about B to C, the information may not be new to
C, in which case C has no reason to change the plan of action
she settled on before A gave her the information about B. Even
if the information is new to C, the beliefs revised in accordance
with that information need not be a reason for C to act dif-
ferently. A banker obtaining information about a customer’s
cancer diagnosis, or an employer learning about a prospective
candidate’s behavior at frat parties, may simply ﬁnd no
grounds therein to change their (dispositions to) actions.
In fact, disclosing private information is often essential to
increase one’s negative freedom. A large number of services are
impossible to obtain if you do not identify yourself (entrance to
a night club, medical services, and so on), and many market
transactions also require one to disclose a great deal of private
information (buying a house, starting a business).22 In such
cases, agent C does update or revise her beliefs about B. But the
22 James Whitman, ‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity
Versus Liberty’, The Yale Law Review 113 (2004): 1151–1221 makes the case
that the strictness of the European privacy legislation in comparison to that
in the US is one of the factors that determine diﬀerences in individuals’
wealth. As it is easier in the US, especially in terms of time and costs, for
banks to obtain information about someone’s credit record, it is also easier
for customers to obtain credit.
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actions (or dispositions) motivated by her new beliefs do not
restrict B’s negative freedom; they increase B’s freedom. It is
true that the examples of privacy invasions given by alarmist
authors typically involve decreases of freedom, but this should
not obscure the fact that disclosures of private information may
lead to decreases as well as to increases of negative freedom, or
to no change at all.
How does this approach to privacy and negative freedom
differ from the traditional arguments from perspective change,
relationships, and so forth? If someone is peeping through my
ofﬁce window all the time I am working on a paper, the
argument from perspective change suggests I may resent this
because it forces me to adopt the observer’s point of view,
thereby making it harder (or even impossible) for me genuinely
to ‘participate’ in my writing activities. And if someone over-
hears me talking to a friend, the argument from relationships
implies this makes it harder (or even impossible) to engage in
the mutual gift-giving essential to friendship. Now this, it might
seem, reveals that the arguments from perspective change and
relationships also indicate ways in which disclosures of private
information make individuals less free. I am less free to work
on the paper, and less free to maintain relationships. Or so it
would seem.
If the traditional arguments relate privacy and freedom at
all, their concept of freedom is certainly not a negative one. The
privacy invasions do not inﬂuence my negative freedom to write
a paper or to perform gift-giving actions, because the peeper
and the eavesdropper do not establish external impediments to
my typing at the keyboard or uttering certain words to my
friend. Moreover, unlike the traditional arguments, my analysis
is not concerned with the (perspective on) actions the agent is
presently performing, but rather with the inﬂuence an invasion
of privacy has on the agent’s extent of negative freedom at
some future point in time. The point is not that the eaves-
dropper makes it less easy to talk to my friend, but that the
eavesdropper may use what my friend and I tell each other in
ways that frustrate my future negative freedom. (Imagine, for
instance, that the eavesdropper is a government informant in
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the rather totalitarian country in which I live, and my friend
and I have talked disparagingly about the president.) Alto-
gether, by focusing on external impediments to future actions,
my approach is very diﬀerent from the traditional ones.
B. Privacy and knowledge about negative freedom
People often resent invasions of their privacy. The traditional
arguments explain the feeling of resentment in terms of a per-
ceived frustration to be a genuine ‘participant’ in a certain action,
by feeling affronted, or by feeling obstructed in realizing a certain
friendship. The problemwith this view, however, is that it is hard
to distinguish between a situation in which a person is peeping
through your window observing you typing a paper, and a
situation in which you share your ofﬁce with a colleague who
observes you typing a paper. Both would be cases of perspective
change, yet most people only feel resentment in the former case.
While the traditional arguments ﬁnd it difﬁcult to account for
such forms of resentment, the approach I put forward can be used
to proffer an explanation. To that end, it is not sufﬁcient to con-
sider theways in which negative freedom is compromised, because
peeper and colleague may change my negative freedom to the
same degree. Rather, we have to consider the inﬂuence of privacy
invasions on a person’s knowledge about negative freedom.
Knowing my colleague quite well, I know that she will not
plagiarizemywork, use the credit card that is lying onmy table to
buy books on the Internet, or gossip to my students about my
habit of talking tomy computer.My knowledge of the peeper, by
contrast, is very limited. I do not knowwhy she is watchingme at
all. For all I know she may be trying to ﬁnd some pattern in my
working hours to plan a burglary of my house; she may be
attempting to get hold of business secrets; she may be checking
whether the ofﬁce contains any things worth stealing; or she may
be an anthropologist doing ﬁeldwork. This only serves to in-
crease my ignorance about the likelihood of interference with
future actions of mine. I am just less sure about what I can do.
Let us consider two examples. Customers of Old National
Bancorp ﬁlled in online forms requesting personal information
from applicants for certain banking services. A hacker obtained
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access to the bank’s computer server, thereby gaining access to
conﬁdential information on more than 10,000 individuals.
Numerous of these individuals decided to buy credit monitoring
services to insure themselves against the risks of future identity
theft, thereby reﬂecting their increased uncertainty about future
interference.23
Three undercover police ofﬁcers investigated a drug conspiracy
in a violent gang in Columbus, Ohio. When some gang members
were tried, their lawyers requested access to the personnel ﬁles of
the ofﬁcers. And that is what the lawyers got. Such ﬁles contain
information about names, home addresses, phone numbers, dri-
ver license numbers, and information about the ofﬁcers’ family
members. None of the ofﬁcers seems to have suffered from any
harm to date; no lawyer seems to have passed on the information
to her clients. Clearly, though, the ofﬁcers’ uncertainty about the
risk of harmful interference has increased.24
The connection between an invasion of privacy and reduced
knowledge about negative freedom is a kind of ‘internalization’
of the earlier connection between privacy and negative freedom.
Agent A discloses private information about B to C. Agent B
knows about the disclosure and, internalizing the three-step
process linking privacy to negative freedom, she knows that C
may use the information to motivate the performance (or
omission) of certain actions or the adoption of certain dispo-
sitions to perform (or omit) certain actions.25 If B knows C
23 Pisciotta v. Old Nat. Bancorp 499 F. 3d. 629 (2007).
24 Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F. 3d. 1055 (1998).
25 If B is unaware of the fact that Adiscloses private information about B to
C, then the internalization will not take place. This means that if novel
information about B makes C interfere with B, then B will not know that.
Agent B’s knowledge about negative freedom is then reduced, but not because
B has changed her beliefs (as when she internalizes), but because B has not
changed her beliefs, even though her negative freedom has changed. (An
example is when unbeknown to me someone makes use of my Social Security
Number to obtain credit.) This scenario reveals a second way in which known
freedom decreases after an invasion of privacy, but I do not treat it as a
separate category in the paper since it also directly involves a decrease of
negative freedom.The interesting cases involve a decrease of knowledge about
negative freedom that is not accompanied by a decrease of negative freedom.
See section III, ‘‘Privacy and Knowledge About Negative Freedom’’.
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well, B has some information about C’s current beliefs, about
the ways C revises her beliefs, and about C’s desires. As a
consequence, B can predict the inﬂuence that the disclosure of
private information will have on C’s actions, and C’s knowl-
edge about negative freedom will be as accurate as it was pre-
viously.26 If B does not know C, she will not be able to infer
anything about what C will do with the information. She will
not be able to predict C’s action, and consequently, her
knowledge about negative freedom will be reduced.27
III. PRIVACY AND NEGATIVE FREEDOM
The advantage of the approach to privacy I am advocating here
is that it allows us to cast arguments about the special pro-
tection of a person’s privacy in a uniform, normative vocabu-
lary. Whether or not to protect a person’s privacy in a
certain situation is almost always a question of balancing. The
traditional arguments, however, put a rather heterogeneous
collection on the scales: perspective changes or human dignity
on the one side, for instance, and freedom of speech or freedom
of market transactions on the other. As soon as we cast the
26 Of course, B’s negative freedom may be less. But if that is so, then B
knows it.
27 Several champions of the argument from autonomy also consider the
eﬀects of privacy invasions on the expectations of the subject. However,
their position diﬀers crucially from the approach I proﬀer here, since it is
not beliefs about the extent of one’s negative freedom with which these
authors are concerned, but rather beliefs about the ‘level’ of privacy pro-
tection one enjoys. If, unbeknown to me, someone is watching me practicing
the salsa in my oﬃce, it is my current beliefs – my belief that I am dancing
unobserved – on which the argument from autonomy focuses. That is, a
belief about the presence of observers. The beliefs ﬁguring in my approach,
by contrast, are beliefs about my future negative freedom. See Ro¨ssler, The
Value of Privacy; Robert McArthur, ‘Reasonable Expectations of Privacy’,
Ethics and Information Technology 3 (2001): 123–128. To some extent, the
argument from autonomy may not even be able to ﬁnd fault with a peeper
whom I know to be watching me practicing the salsa. In that case, no
incorrect beliefs arise about my level of privacy. Following my approach, by
contrast, observed and unobserved invasions of privacy can be seen to harm
my liberty interests.
THE LIBERAL VALUE OF PRIVACY 519
value of privacy in terms of negative freedom, only one unit of
measurement is needed – liberty.28
This strategy bears certain risks, though. Liberal privacy
skeptics may concede that I have connected invasions of pri-
vacy to changes in the extent of a person’s negative freedom,
but they can still refuse to draw any normative conclusions
from that analysis on the grounds that whether or not the re-
cipient C of the private information uses the information to
interfere with subject B is up to C’s moral and legal responsi-
bility. If, upon receiving new information about B, agent C
decides to use B’s credit card number or to ﬁre her because of
sexual prejudices, then C does something that is already pro-
hibited by law, so there is no ground for protecting privacy
here. And if, upon receiving the information about B, agent C
decides to put an end to her friendship with B, then that is
something B simply has to cope with, however immoral it may
be.29
This move to moral and legal responsibility is standard in
many cases where liberal values are balanced. Consider, for
instance, the connection between media violence and sub-
sequent aggressive behavior. Proponents of legal measures
suggest that the statistical correlation is strong, and that the
interests of the potential victims of aggression outweigh the
interests of the viewers of certain movies and television shows.30
Opponents of regulation, by contrast, point out that as long as
the individual viewer can be held morally and legally responsible
for the aggressive acts there is no need for the regulation of
media violence. It suﬃces to have laws prohibiting homicide,
assault, and so on.
Such an argument against regulation of media violence
succeeds only if it is possible to assign responsibility to the
28 Section IV, ‘‘Privacy and Knowledge About Negative Freedom’’ dis-
cusses the value of knowledge about negative freedom.
29 Herman Tavani and Frances Grodzinsky, ‘Cyberstalking, Personal
Privacy, and Moral Responsibility’, Ethics and Information Technology 4
(2002): 123–132 examine the responsibility of Internet providers and users in
the context of cyberstalking.
30 Susan Hurley, ‘Imitation, Media Violence, and Freedom of Speech’,
Philosophical Studies 117 (2004): 165–218.
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perpetrators of aggressive acts subsequent to exposure to media
violence, and that assumption may not be true. If, for instance,
viewers copy aggressive behavior they have seen on television in
ways that bypass autonomous and responsible decision mak-
ing, then it is doubtful whether they can be held responsible. In
such a case legal regulation of media violence may come into
sight.
In the case of media violence this is probably hard to defend,
because copycat crime and other forms of aggression following
exposure to media violence often involve a huge amount of
advance planning, which is incompatible with decreased or
bypassed autonomy. Moreover, only a small number of viewers
ever engage in subsequent aggressive acts.31 Matters are dif-
ferent in the case of privacy, though.
Recipients of private information tend to be credulous, they
tend to overgeneralize on the basis of limited information, and
they often suﬀer from prejudices – all without their being aware
of it. Besides that, the collective eﬀect of the actions performed
by recipients of private information is often considerable, even
though the individual agents’ contributions are small. And
recipients of information frequently remain anonymous. These
empirical facts about belief revision and human agency suggest
that in many cases it is hard, or even impossible, to assign
moral or legal responsibility to the recipients of private infor-
mation for the freedom-decreasing eﬀects of their actions.32 Let
me explain.
A. Collectivity
A good illustration of the structure of collective interference is
given by e-mail spam, junk mail, and unsolicited phone calls.
One phone call from one company may be annoying, but if you
receive a phone call a day (typically around dinner time)
31 See Boudewijn de Bruin, ‘Media Violence and Freedom of Speech:
How to Use Empirical Data’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 11/5
(2008): 493–505.
32 Charles Stangor, ed. Stereotypes and Prejudices (Philadelphia: Taylor
and Francis, 2000) collects a number of key papers in the psychological
literature.
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because your phone company has sold information about your
household to numerous other companies, you are simply suf-
fering a decrease in your negative freedom. The same is true
when your surface mailbox is stuﬀed with catalogs and other
mailings from companies you will never buy from (you have to
trash them), and when removing spam takes you valuable
(business) time every day; not to speak about e-mail messages
that accidentally get lost in the deletion process. Estimates of
the costs of spam, for instance, amount to $130 billion world-
wide, and $42 billion in the US – for just a single year, that is.33
Moreover, collective interference may have much more
devastating effects than these relatively harmless examples
suggest, especially now that the Internet has rapidly become a
place where large groups of people voice their opinions on
political and social topics, as well as on individual citizens. A
sadly famous case involved a South-Korean college student
who was photographed by a bystander when she refused to
clean up her dog’s accidental excrement on the Seoul subway.
Posted on an Internet forum, the story led people to condemn
her behavior, often in extremely violent language. One or two
comments she might have found bearable, but hundreds or
even thousands of Internet tirades made her case so famous
that she was recognized as the ‘dog poop girl’ wherever she went
on the Seoul campus, and treated as such – she quit college.34
What is important here is that these collective effects are not
always readily sensed by the individual agents. If I send you one
catalog once a year, or make an unsolicited phone call, in my
view this is only a tiny disturbance of your life. Likewise, the
Internet commentators do not see themselves as part of a large
protest crowd, and they would probably not participate in
marches gathering against a girl who does not clean up in the
subway. Put abstractly, the recipients of the information know
what they are doing, but they do not always know that many
others are doing the same thing; and if they know that others
33 Estimation by Ferris Research, a ﬁrm specializing in communication
research, for 2009. See http://www.ferris.com/research-library/industry-
statistics.
34 Daniel Solove, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy
on the Internet (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 1–2.
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are doing the same thing, they are not aware of the fact that all
these individual, anonymous actions may add up to massive,
collective interference.35
B. Anonymity
Collectivity of interference makes it conceptually problematic
to assign responsibility to interfering recipients of private
information; that recipients often remain anonymous is a
practical reason why responsibility is hard to designate. Dat-
abases such as those developed after Megan’s Law aﬀord
anonymous individuals access to information about numerous
sex oﬀenders; individuals ranting on Internet forums often
contribute anonymously; hackers and identity thieves remain
largely unidentiﬁed; and newspapers and TV news shows cater
to a largely anonymous audience. If they interfere, it is hard to
backtrack these individuals and hold them responsible.36
C. Credulity
It was once said on the Web that Tommy Hilﬁger, the fashion
designer, had remarked to Oprah Winfrey that ‘If I had known
African-Americans, Hispanics, Jews and Asians would buy my
clothes, I would not have made them so nice. I wish these
people would not buy my clothes, as they are made for upper-
class white people’. It cost his company a lot of money. Readers
35 The sender of the information possesses more extensive knowledge
than the recipient. Most of the time, she knows to whom she has passed on
the information, and she will generally have rather accurate beliefs about the
use recipients are likely to make of the information. This is one of the
reasons why relevant legal cases involve individuals suing the sender rather
than the (interfering) recipients of the information. In Smith v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 293 A.D. 2d. 598 (2002), for instance, customers sued a
bank for selling personal data to third parties who would use the data for
advertising purposes. Realizing that a claim against an individual party
sending out one unsolicited catalog would be entirely hopeless, they sued the
bank – unsuccessfully. (Courts that recognize the diﬀerence between indi-
vidually harmless actions and collectively harmful results might decide dif-
ferently.)
36 Solove, The Future of Reputation, pp. 139–149.
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took the report seriously. In reality, though, Hilﬁger had never
been on Oprah’s show at that time. The rumor was entirely
false.37
Richard Posner and other privacy skeptics believe that the
Internet offers a fast and powerful means to set errors right,
because ‘private demand for screening for accuracy will even-
tually result in equipping the Internet with quality controls as
effective as those of the traditional media’.38 I do not think we
can be very optimistic here, though. First of all, while I may
have a clear interest in the accuracy of information provided by
my bank and my insurance company, I may just not care too
much about Hilﬁger clothes to require the same level of accu-
racy here. What is more, even if websites started printing cor-
rections, as newspapers often do, this would not be too
successful a corrective mechanism because many people will
never return to the website where they read the false rumor.
Finally, while the reliability of most websites is notoriously
hard to judge, many individuals have a tendency to believe such
rumors as the one about Hilﬁger on the grounds that, even if it
is not entirely true, it will be ‘basically’ true – where there’s
smoke there’s ﬁre.
D. Overgeneralization
Many recipients are eager to generalize beyond justiﬁcation on
the basis of information they obtain. Suppose you show me a
video clip of a man yelling at a young child for no obvious
reason. Instead of stating that I cannot form any reasonable
beliefs about the man on the basis of only ten seconds of video
footage, I will probably form a negative opinion about him,
and I may use this opinion to decide against hiring him as a
baby sitter, say, or day care employee. While this may sound
outrageous, it is precisely what employers do when, as we saw
earlier, they examine prospective candidates’ social networking
proﬁles. What appears on Facebook proﬁles reﬂects only part
37 Nicholas DiFonzo, The Watercooler Eﬀect (London: Penguin Books,
2008), pp. 204–205.
38 Richard Posner, Frontiers of Legal Theory (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2004), p. 93.
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of a person’s life, and it is plausible that candidates whose
proﬁle is more conventional (or simply nonexistent) engage in
roughly the same kind of social activities during their student
years as those who display them more openly on the Internet.
But many an employer will fail to pay heed to such statistical
reasoning when deciding on a candidate.
E. Prejudice
Recipients of private information often process information in
light of a body of background beliefs – or prejudices – of which
many are false. To give an example, numerous men and women
suffer from false preconceptions about rape victims, such as
that women encourage men to rape, that rapists are lower-class,
or that women’s rape reports are often false.39 Such prejudices
nurture incorrect beliefs that inﬂuence the ways in which, in the
present example, individuals treat people they know to be rape
victims. In fact, while the US does not yet seem to have wit-
nessed such extremes, some European rape victims are reported
to have been renounced by their families, disinherited, and
divorced on the basis of exactly this prejudice.
If people could be held responsible for the false beliefs to
which credulity, overgeneralization and prejudice lead, the
skeptic would perhaps not yet be moved to afford special
protection to privacy. But the psychological literature on cre-
dulity, overgeneralization and prejudice not only reveals how
widespread the phenomena actually are; it also shows that we
frequently fail to notice it when we ourselves are subject to
these inﬂuences. We are often unaware of our preconceptions
and of the fact that we are far too ready to draw conclusions
and adopt beliefs. To give one example, the way television news
programs frame news items has a considerable effect on the
viewers’ beliefs, and this is an effect of which most viewers
remain unaware. When the Iraq war started in 2003, about
30% of Fox News viewers believed that American intelligence
39 Marietta Sze-chie Fa, ‘Rape Myths in American and Chinese Laws and
Legal Systems: Do Tradition and Culture Make the Diﬀerence?’, Maryland
Series in Contemporary Asian Studies 4 (2007): 1–109.
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had actually found weapons of mass destruction. How is that
possible, in the face of massive counterevidence? To be sure,
Fox News did not state any falsehood. Rather, false beliefs
were induced in the viewers by means of long-term framing
techniques. News programs consistently devoted more atten-
tion to White House statements about alleged proofs of the
presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq than to the
withdrawals that would always follow. Statements of proofs,
for instance, would ﬁgure in the opening of a news show,
accompanied by vivid visual imagery or interviews with ‘ex-
perts’. Withdrawals, by contrast, would be deferred to the end
of the show, being only read out by the anchor, with no images
or interviews.40 Without knowing about these techniques,
numerous viewers were led to false beliefs for which they can
hardly be held responsible.41
To summarize, privacy invasions may lead to decreases in
the subject’s extent of negative freedom. As far as the inter-
ferers can be held responsible for the interference, the liberal
40 Steven Kull et al., ‘Misperceptions, the Media and the Iraq War’,
PIPA/Knowledge Networks 2 October 2003; Stephan Lewandowsky et al.,
‘Memory for Fact, Fiction, and Misinformation: The Iraq War 2003’,
Psychological Science 16 (2005): 190–195. The ﬁgures compare with around
20% for most other national networks, and 10% for PBS. With respect to
the question whether there was, in 2003, clear proof of a connection between
Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein the ﬁgures are even more worrying; they
range from about 70% for Fox to 16% for PBS. The PIPA report makes
clear that only part of the diﬀerence may be explained by diﬀerent char-
acteristics of the viewer populations of the networks.
41 I do not suggest that one can never be responsible for one’s ignorance.
A family doctor cannot excuse herself by saying that she did not know of a
likely side eﬀect of a common medication she prescribed. But it seems
unreasonable to demand from most Fox News viewers that they are aware
of the intricate framing techniques and their eﬀects on belief formation in
viewers. Alvin Goldman, ‘Epistemic Paternalism: Communication Control
in Law and Society’, Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991): 113–131 discusses the
inﬂuence of biases and overgeneralization on jury members, pleading for a
kind of epistemic paternalism. For a growing body of philosophical research
into epistemic normativity, see the special issue of Synthese on ‘Epistemic
Deontologism’ (vol. 161, no. 3, April 2008).
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privacy skeptic may not be moved to regulate.42 But I have
shown several circumstances where it is hard, or even impos-
sible, to assign responsibility. It is in exactly these cases that the
subject’s liberty interest in the protection of privacy has to be
balanced against the liberty interests the recipients have in
freedom of information, speech, and so on. To be sure, the
actual weighing of interests is going to be a diﬃcult task, and
the subjects of the private information will certainly not always
win. Yet, if my analysis of privacy invasions in terms of nega-
tive freedom is correct, and if the beliefs that underlie the
recipient’s interference with the subject of the information do at
least in certain circumstances form in ways that bypass
autonomy, then there is a clear reason why the liberal privacy
skeptic has to abandon his or her skepticism. Privacy is a liberal
value, and it does outweigh other liberal values in certain cases.
IV. PRIVACY AND KNOWLEDGE ABOUT NEGATIVE FREEDOM
Numerous liberal theorists have developed arguments for the
value of negative freedom, such as the argument from experi-
ments in living, the argument from progress, the argument from
responsibility, and the argument from desire satisfaction.43
While these arguments are often quite involved, their structure
is quite plain: If a person’s negative freedom increases, she can
try out diﬀerent ways of living; she can engage in more activities
that lead to technological, scientiﬁc or cultural progress; she
can more often assume responsibility for her actions (instead of
leaving responsibility to other individuals or the state); and she
will be better placed to satisfy her desires.
42 Another factor is the subject’s responsibility. Compare medical and
criminal records. If we suppose that in both cases recipients of private
information are prone to similar epistemic errors (and to the same extent),
we may still want to distinguish between them if individuals can be held
responsible for their crimes, but not for their diseases.
43 See, for instance, John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: John W.
Parker and Son, 1859); Friedrich von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); Thomas Hurka, ‘Why Value
Autonomy?’ Social Theory and Practice 13 (1987): 361–382; Ian Carter, ‘The
Independent Value of Freedom’, Ethics 105 (1995): 819–845.
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A closer examination of the precise structure of these argu-
ments reveals that they are not merely arguments for negative
freedom, but also for knowledge about negative freedom. It is
nice to have the negative freedom to perform some action, A,
but I will not perform A as long as I am unaware of the fact
that I am free to perform A. Only those freedoms of which I
have knowledge will ﬁgure in experiments in living and
responsible decision making, or lead to progress and desire
satisfaction. Freedom is valuable, but knowledge about free-
dom is valuable, too. I call this ‘known freedom’, and it in-
cludes not only knowledge about one’s freedom, but also about
one’s unfreedom, because to know that you are unfree to per-
form a certain action spares you the frustration of ‘attempting
the impossible’, as Isaiah Berlin observed.44
In section II, ‘‘Privacy, Freedom, and Knowledge’’ we saw
that invasions of privacy may lead to a reduction of knowledge
about negative freedom. If subject B of the private information
knows that A has disclosed private information about her to
recipient C, but B does not know what C will do with the
information (how she will revise her beliefs, and what actions or
dispositions she will settle on), then B will have to suspend a
number of beliefs about future negative freedom.45 A lot hinges
on whether B can predict C’s belief revision and C’s actions or
dispositions. Suppose I believe that I can ﬂy to London from
Tehran. In one scenario I subsequently learn that my travel
itineraries have been publicized, and I also learn that because of
that my name has been put on no-ﬂy lists of all airline carriers
connecting Tehran and London. As a result, I know I am no
longer free to ﬂy to London directly. This constitutes a reduc-
tion of negative freedom, but not a reduction of knowledge
44 Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1958), p. 29. This is not the place to discuss the argument for known free-
dom in more detail. See, apart from Berlin’s inaugural lecture, Boudewijn de
Bruin, ‘Liberal and Republican Freedom’, Journal of Political Philosophy,
17/4 (2009): 418–439; Carter, A Measure of Freedom; Hurka, ‘Why Value
Autonomy?’
45 An agent ‘suspends’ belief about a proposition, P, whenever she does
not adopt any doxastic attitude towards P. She does not believe that P is
true, but nor does she believe that P is false.
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about my freedom and unfreedom, as I do have accurate beliefs
about my unfreedom to ﬂy to London.
In another scenario, the only thing I learn is that my travel
itineraries have been sold to some airline carriers. Not knowing
much about the criteria that underlie no-ﬂy lists, but knowing
that my travel itineraries may be thought of as ‘suspicious’, I do
not know for sure that I will be barred from ﬂying. But neither
am I sure that I will not, so I have to suspend my initial belief
that I can ﬂy to London. This constitutes a genuine reduction
of known freedom.
In the examples discussed in section II, ‘‘Privacy, Freedom,
and Knowledge’’, a hacker gained access to the ﬁnancial
records of a bank’s customers, and lawyers of a criminal gang
obtained information contained in the personnel ﬁles of
undercover police oﬃcers who had investigated the gang’s
alleged drug conspiracy activities. As we saw, this led to a
decrease in the victims’ known freedom. Upon learning about
the privacy invasion, the victims suspended their beliefs about
their freedom and unfreedom.
Not all decreases in known freedom should be taken seri-
ously when we weigh liberal interests, though. Agent A informs
C, a notorious car thief, about the fact that B is the owner of a
Porsche Turbo. Agent B learns about the disclosure, and claims
no longer to know that her car will not be stolen. But B still
parks the car in front of her house, often even leaving it with
the key in the ignition. She still acts on the belief that her car is
safe. So there is no demonstrable change of belief. Or suppose
that A informs C, a reliable and law-abiding friend of B, about
the fact that B is the owner of a Porsche Turbo. Agent B learns
about the disclosure and decides to hire a person to guard the
car 24 h a day. In this case, B’s known freedom did in fact
decrease – she did revise her beliefs about the likelihood
of car theft – but she adopted an irrational, paranoid belief
revision policy.
These two cases show that the belief change that underlies
the decrease in knowledge about freedom has to be demon-
strable and reasonable. To grasp something of what this con-
cretely means, let us look at a recent legal case concerning
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privacy, Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance.46 This
case is about burglary leading to the theft of laptops and
computer hardware on which personal information was stored
about Tri-West customers (names, home addresses, and social
security numbers). The personal data of one of the plaintiﬀs
(Brandt) were used on several occasions in attempts to illegally
obtain a credit account; those of the other plaintiﬀs (Stollen-
werk and his wife) were not. Stollenwerk judged the risk of
identity theft high enough to buy credit monitoring services and
additional insurance, and claimed damages accordingly. The
court, however, rejected his claim.
Stollenwerk’s known freedom decreased in demonstrable and
reasonable ways. Stollenwerk’s action of buying credit moni-
toring services and extra insurance clearly demonstrates that he
changed his beliefs about the likelihood of future interference.
He would not have bought such services had he thought that he
had incurred no additional risks because of the burglary.
Moreover, his beliefs were reasonable to adopt. Computer
servers may be stolen for their hardware, but they are also
stolen for the data stored on them. Furthermore, the fact that
another person’s data were in fact misused (which the court
accepted) shows that Stollenwerk’s suspicions were far from
irrational. He did not, for instance, change his beliefs in para-
noid ways, claiming an increased likelihood of, say, kidnapping
or burglary of his house; and the court documents suggest that
he was careful enough to request advise from insurance spe-
cialists.47
The Stollenwerk court, in common with many others, was
unwilling to adopt this kind of reasoning, though. In one kind
46 Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, 254 Fed. Appx. 664
(2007).
47 The burglary was even covered by national newspapers, in which many
experts pointed out the risks run by the victims. The New York Times
published an article two weeks before Brandt and Stollenwerk ﬁled their
original claim. This article quotes Tri-West’s president as stating that, ‘It is
unlikely that people were breaking in for resale value…. They left things that
were more valuable and easier to hock’. See Adam Clymer, ‘Threats and
Responses: Privacy; Oﬃcials Say Troops Risk Identity Theft After Bur-
glary’, The New York Times 12 January 2003.
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of decision, courts have concluded that the plaintiﬀs lack
standing to pursue their claims. In Giordano v. Wachovia Secu-
rities, LLC, for instance, a customer sued her ﬁnancial services
company because a package containing information about cus-
tomers’ names, addresses, and social security numbers was lost in
transit by UPS. The court found that the plaintiﬀ lacked con-
stitutional standing to bring this action on the grounds that, as
the plaintiﬀ’s claims about the possibility of future identity theft
were ‘at best… speculative’, she had been unsuccessful in proving
that she had suﬀered a compensable injury.48
In another line of decisions, courts did rule that plaintiffs
have standing to bring suit. In Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., for instance,
the plaintiﬀ entered personal information on a website when he
applied online for a job at Gap. A laptop was stolen containing
his and other applicants’ information. Unlike in the Giordano
decision, the court in Ruiz relied on an expert opinion about the
probability of suﬀering identity theft. It accepted that in the
ﬁrst year after the breach the probability of identity theft is
about ﬁve times as high as the average probability of identity
theft (it rises from 4% to 19%), and therefore concluded that
the plaintiﬀ had standing to sue. However, since the plaintiﬀ
could not demonstrate any actual damage, the court did not
ﬁnd the increased risk of identity theft a compensable injury.49
Rather than awarding damages in data breach cases, the
trend is only to require that customers be notiﬁed of data
breaches. Now, it is surely true that notiﬁcation does not go
against individuals’ known freedom. Using the statistics from
Ruiz, if my personal information is breached there is a 19%
chance that I will become the victim of identity theft within a
year. As a victim of identity theft has to spend, on average,
about 80 h and $850 to alleviate the consequences of that theft,
it constitutes a signiﬁcant form of interference.50 Accordingly,
48 Giordano v. Wachovia Securities, LLC, 2006 WL 2177036. For other
relevant cases, see Jay M. Zitter, ‘Liability for Risk of Future Identity
Theft’, American Law Reports 6th, 50 (2009): 33.
49 Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 908. Pisciotta and Stollenwerk are
similar. See Zitter, ‘Liability for Risk’.
50 Eric Eisenstein, ‘Identity Theft: An Exploratory Study with Implica-
tions for Marketers’, Journal of Business Research 61/11 (2008), 1160–1172.
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learning about the increased likelihood of identity theft ad-
vances one’s known freedom.51
Even though a liberal will favor mandatory disclosure of
data breach, she has good reason to question the court’s con-
ception of the predicament of data breach victims. To start
with, she will dispute the courts’ belief that the larger risk of
future identity theft is ‘speculative’. There are reliable statistical
data about identity theft in the US, and to set these data aside
as speculation does not do justice to the methodology that
underlies them.52 Now, it may be that the courts’ judgments
about speculative probabilities concern the size of the proba-
bilities rather than the source of information about the prob-
abilities. But that line of reasoning is equally dubious. A chance
of 19% that you will have to spend 80 h and $850 to right the
consequences of identity theft is a very substantial risk.
Moreover, from a statistical point of view, what best charac-
terizes the situation is not the mere ﬁgure of a 19% chance of
identity theft, but rather the ﬁvefold increase from 4% (average
citizen) to 19% (after data breach).53 So there is no ground to
set aside the probabilities as ‘speculative’.
The second reason to ﬁnd fault with the courts is that they
embrace the view that a risk of future identity theft does not
constitute an ‘actual’ harm. Following the approach to the
liberal value of privacy advocated in this paper, there are two
ways in which disclosure of private information may harm the
subject of that information. The ﬁrst is a decrease of freedom: it
may lead others to interfere or to form dispositions to interfere.
Admittedly, as no plaintiff was able to demonstrate such harm
in court, this ﬁrst form of harm does not apply here. Yet, as I
argued, the second way in which disclosure of private infor-
mation may harm the subject is that it decreases her known
freedom: the person’s beliefs about her freedom and unfreedom
deteriorate. What is important now is that the inadequacy of
51 See footnote 25, and my observation about no-ﬂy lists in section IV,
‘‘Privacy and Knowledge About Negative Freedom’’.
52 Eisenstein, ‘Identity Theft’.
53 To see this, suppose that the chance of identity theft for an average US
citizen were 18% instead of 4%. An increase to 19% due to data breach
would now be entirely negligible.
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these beliefs is far from hypothetical. They are faulty, not in a
hypothetical future, but at the very moment of the data breach,
and a direct consequence of that is that the person’s present
decision-making capacities are frustrated. She is less well-
positioned than she was before the data breach to engage in
responsible planning and decision making, because she will
have to incorporate, in her current planning, the fact that
her beliefs about certain freedoms and unfreedoms are less
adequate than before the breach.
To summarize, I have argued that there are good reasons for
the courts to rethink their reliance on a principle of ‘no harm,
no foul’ in recent data breach cases. To be sure, this is not
meant to downplay the difﬁculty the courts will face in ascer-
taining whether, after the data breach, plaintiffs revise their
beliefs in demonstrable and reasonable ways. Nor should it
obscure the fact that the argument for the liberal value of
privacy is aimed in the ﬁrst place at the liberal privacy skeptic,
not the courts. Nevertheless, there is no reason why my argu-
ment, if cogent, should not also inform jurisprudence. Inva-
sions of privacy may decrease a person’s freedom, or her
knowledge about freedom, and both constitute harm to her
liberty interests.
V. CONCLUSION
My argument about the liberal value of privacy is cast in terms
of a rather narrow concept of freedom, but it applies equally to
any broader concept of freedom that subsumes pure negative
freedom. To the extent that a decrease in pure negative freedom
constitutes a decrease in, say, republican freedom – or any
other concept for that matter – my argument shows that pri-
vacy has republican value, too.54 Moreover, while my argument
has been directed at the liberal privacy skeptic who fails to be
convinced by arguments from perspective change, relation-
54 See, e.g., Ian Carter, ‘How are Power and Unfreedom Related?’
Republicanism and Political Theory, ed. C. Laborde and J. Maynor (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2008), pp. 58–82; Matthew Kramer, ‘Liberty and Domination’,
in op. cit., pp. 31–57. Cf. Boudewijn de Bruin, ‘Liberal and Republican
Freedom’.
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ships, or dignity, my defense of the liberal value of privacy adds
to these arguments rather than contradicting them. It is easier
to weigh one person’s privacy against another’s freedom of
speech, say, if we use one and the same currency for both
persons’ interests: the value of freedom; that is, it is easier to
compare the value of your freedom with the value of my free-
dom than to compare the value of your freedom with the value
of my relationships or dignity. As a result, champions of the
arguments from perspective change, relationships, or dignity
have good reason to complement their views of privacy with the
approach oﬀered here. Nevertheless, the primary aim has been
to show that theorists operating with pure negative freedom do
not remain empty-handed where privacy is concerned. Even for
them, privacy is valuable.
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